The Chevron doctrine is a principle in administrative law that refers to the doctrine of judicial deference given to administrative actions. It was coined after a landmark case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., in 1984. The doctrine holds that when a legislative delegation to an administrative agency on a particular issue or question is not explicit but rather implicit, a court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrative agency. In other words, the courts will defer to the agencys own construction of its operating statute, unless that construction is outside the range of reasonableness, usually because the meaning of the statute is clear. The Chevron doctrine is particularly important when the question is the scope of the agency's own authority.
The Chevron doctrine has become a central pillar of the modern administrative state, as Congress delegates vast swathes of policy-making power to the regulatory agencies. However, the application of the Chevron doctrine in practice has become increasingly complex, and there is debate among courts and scholars about which types of agency actions are subject to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court is currently considering a case, Raimondo, No. 22-451, on the question of whether to overturn or limit Chevron deference. If the Court overrules or limits Chevron, it would constitute a watershed decision in administrative law, greatly increasing the prospects of businesses, organizations, and individuals successfully challenging administrative action in court under the Administrative Procedure Act.
